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In U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., Justice Thurgood Marshall announced
that "[a] ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise.", In The Antitrust Constitution, Thomas
Nachbar takes seriously the idea that federal antitrust laws serve a
constitutional function. He argues that, contrary to common assumptions,
the antitrust laws cannot be understood merely as a form of economic
utilitarianism.3 Rather, they serve the additional purpose of preventing
"regulatory harm," the assertion of law-like control over the conduct of
others outside the sphere of one's own property interests.4
Nachbar's argument is original and provocative, but dubious. For one,
he does not make it clear whether his argument is positive or normative,
which makes it hard either to refute or substantiate the claim. Either way,
there are serious problems. If the argument is positive, there are much more
plausible explanations for the current U.S. antitrust system. If the argument
is normative, it is ultimately unappealing and could seriously threaten
economic efficiency. Despite the rhetoric of constitutionalism that is
sometimes invoked, antitrust is best understood as an instrumental tool of
economic regulation whose oddities and quirks are better explained by its
peculiar institutional context rather than by a generalized ideological
commitment to constitutional values:

*
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ANTITRUST AS POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

In order to agree with Nachbar that the Sherman Act has something
like constitutional status, one would need a theory of what it means for a
body of law to be constitutional. Although constitutional theories are not in
short supply, Nachbar does not offer such a theory.6 Rather, Nachbar seems
to assume that antitrust law is constitutional if it behaves in parallel with
certain constitutional values. By that logic, the interpretation of wills would
become constitutional if it turned out that courts tended to use similar
interpretive tools on wills and constitutional texts. Thematic parallelism
between two bodies of law is a weak reason to think of them as unified. In
any event, I would be reluctant to start thinking about antitrust law in
constitutional terms without a broader inquiry into the criteria for
constitutional inclusion.
Nachbar puts emphasis on the Supreme Court's repeated assertion that
that the Sherman Act is akin to the Magna Carta.7 Fair enough, but one
should take into account not only what the Court says but what it does. The
last invocation of the "Magna Carta" language was by Justice Scalia in Trinko,
who followed the quote immediately with the disjunctive "but."8 It's hard to
think of Trinko, which is widely considered one of the most antitrustskeptical opinions ever written, as furthering a constitutional theory of
antitrust. The Court held that a monopolist has no antitrust duty to share its
telecommunications infrastructure with rivals.9 One could try to make this fit
Nachbar's property/regulatory distinction by noting that Verizon was
allowed to fully exploit its property interest-except that Verizon no longer
had a classic property interest. The 1gg6 Telecommunications Act created

6.
If one wants to think seriously about what it means for a body of law to be
constitutional, a large and complex literature awaits. See Richard Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, So U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2013) (arguing that "constitutional rules
exhibit a mix-and-match variety of charateristics" instead of a "single attribute [] essential for
constitutional status"); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR &cJOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (20 o); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH (1988) (exploring the problems and issues with defining American identity by accepting
the Constitution and constitutional ideals); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (examining the
Constitution not as a limiting or enforcing document, but as one that empowers political actors
to formulate policy); K N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1,3
(1934) (arguing that the constitution should be thought of "not [as] a document, but a living
institution").
It is a little strange to think that the invocation of a constitutional document from
7.
Britain stands as the central metaphor for U.S. antitrust constitutionalism. Perhaps the Bill of
Rights would have been a better reference point.
8.

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16

(2004) ("The Sherman Act is indeed the 'Magna Carta of free enterprise,' . . but it does not

give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever
some other approach might yield greater competition.").

g.

Id. at 4o7-1 1.
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an affirmative obligation on the part of local incumbent exchange carriers
to share their infrastructure with new entrants. In the language of Calabresi
and Melamed,o Congress has shifted the governance of telecom
infrastructure from property rules to liability rules. By affirming Verizon's
antitrust right to exclude, the Court was effectively reinstating a property
right that Congress and the Federal Communications Commission had
taken away. One could argue that this itself points to the constitutional value
at stake-the Court was protecting against uncompensated takings of
property by Congress-but that doesn't work either, since the Court has
otherwise upheld the Telecommunications Act's infrastructure sharing
obligations.- Trinko is best understood as an opinion that reflects the
cobbling together of an uneasy coalition of free-market and technocratic
Justices who managed to agree on an outcome given the alignment of
institutional and substantive considerations.
Trinho is just one example. One can certainly find cases that can be
made to do some of the things that Nachbar wants them to. But it is difficult
to credit the paper's theory that the property/regulatory distinction supplies
a general, positive theory of U.S. antitrust doctrine. Indeed, it would be
quite surprising if one could locate any general, positive theory of U.S.
antitrust doctrine. Over the 12o-some years that we have had a federal
antitrust law, there have been a number of radical paradigmatic shifts. For
what does Nachbar's theory account? Late nineteenth century classicism,
early twentieth-century Progressivism, the associationalism of the 192os, the
collectivism of the early New Deal, the Brandeisian atomistic competitionism
of the mid-New Deal, the business commonwealth ideas that dominated the
late New Deal, post-War structuralism, the Chicago School, post-Chicago,
etc.?12 At most, Nachbar's positive account could be made to correlate with
some strand of U.S. antitrust law.
But which one? Nachbar acknowledges that his theory of antitrust
constitutionalism tracks somewhat with the Brandeisian tradition, which he
labels "societal antitrust."1s It's quite difficult to make the Brandeisian
tradition do the work of prohibiting private regulation in Nachbar's sense.
As Nachbar acknowledges in a footnote,14 Brandeis's landmark definition of
the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade asserts that restraints that "merely

10.
Guido Calabresi & A- Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
i.
12.

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
See generally DANIEL A- CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE MAKING OF COMPETITION

POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (2013).

13.

Nachbar, supra note 2, at 66-67.

14.

Id. at 78 11.67.
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regulate[]" competition are permissible.15 Nachbar argues that the
"regulation" in question was actually the mere control over property rights
within the scope of the joint venture and hence not "regulatory" in his sense.
But Justice Brandeis justified the rule as having "regulatory" effects on a
whole host of activities outside the direct scope of trading on the Board of
Trade. Among other things, the call rule supposedly broke up a wholesaler's
monopoly and allowed for better prices for distant country dealers and
farmers-people who weren't directly participating on the Board. 6
It's not hard to think of other arrangements that antitrust law tolerates
although they're regulatory in Nachbar's sense. For example, antitrust law
allows significant latitude for self-regulation by professional organizations. In
California Dental, the dental association was permitted to stop its members
from advertising about price or quality on the theory that such advertising
tended to be fraudulent. 17 That sounds an awful lot like "a form of control
most commonly observed through the operation of law-the means through
which governments operate on private interests."8
An even more paradigmatic example is private standard-setting
organizations ("SSO"), which antitrust law polices but does not prohibit.
The members of an SSO come together to create norms that govern
property interests that are not their own-they specify a standard that
applies in the market to things built by other people. Indeed, the one time
that antitrust law becomes most concerned is when certain members of the
SSO try to propertize the standard by drafting it to read on patents that they
own. 19 Even though members of SSOs are regulating property other than
their own, antitrust law generally tolerates it because industry players often
have better technical knowledge than do government regulators.o This type
of consequentialist reasoning, which is inconsistent with an a priori
conception of rights and obligations, explains much of modern antitrust law.

Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of legality
15.
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.").
16.

Id. at 2 4 0- 4 1.

17.

See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-74 (1999).

18.

Nachbar, supra note 2, at 70.
19.
See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F. 3 d 297, 314 (3 d Cir. 2007)
(holding that patentee had unlawfully monopolized by reneging on a commitment to a SSO to
license its patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms); Guido Dartmainn et al.,
Research Project: Standard Setting Organizations (SSO) in an Area of Tension Between Antitrust Law,
Intellectual Property (IP) Law and Innovation, HUMTEC RWTH AACHEN U., http://www.humtec.
rwth-aachei.de/inidex.php?article-id=274&clang=i (last visitedJan. 29, 2014).

20.

Cf U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 53-55 (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/Po 4 o01oiPromotinglniniovationianidCompetitioni
rpto7o 4 .pdf (regulatory action from SSOs is also tolerated because it can be precompetitive).
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In sum, it is not impossible to find examples that fit Nachbar's
paradigm, there are enough counterexamples that the paradigm is difficult
to generalize as a description of positive U.S. law.
II. ANTITRUST AS NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
What about the normative argument? Would it be normatively
appealing to frame antitrust law as a system designed to allow the
exploitation of property rights but not to regulate the conduct of others? I
remain skeptical.
Although Nachbar's argument is original as to U.S. antitrust law, one
could consult other systems that have flirted with constitutionalizing
antitrust principles along the line that Nachbar proposes. In particular, postwar European competition law owes a great deal to the Freiburg
"ordoliberal" school that explicitly considered competition law as part of the
constitutional value structure of a liberal democratic state. 1 For the
ordoliberals, competition was a fundamental requirement of social justice
and a well-functioning society.- Free economic participation by all citizens
was the primary channel for achieving liberal and humane values.23 Market
power by individuals or firms stood in the way of this goal. Accordingly, the
state had an affirmative obligation to promote market competition in order
to secure liberal goals. The ordoliberals understood the promotion of
individual economic freedom as a core obligation of the state. Similar to
Nachbar's conception of regulatory control, freedom in this lexicography
meant the absence of arbitrary control by private actors. Even if
concentrations of market power could advance economic efficiency, the
government could not permit such concentrations without compromising
the liberal interest in personal freedom.
The central problem with this sort of normative conception of antitrust
law-one that ultimately contributed to the erosion of ordoliberal influence
in Europe24-is that private control over others is ubiquitous and antitrust
law is ill-suited to govern it. People and firms control each others' behavior
through contract all of the time. For example, employers control the
behavior of employees in regulatory ways, directing activity and specifying
workplace rules. Purchasers often control the behavior of their suppliers by
specifying not only quality standards for the goods but also production or

2 1. Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, the Freiburg
School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 747, 771,
776-8o (2oo9).

22.

Id. at 769-70.

23.

See id. at

77o-71.

24. In the last decade, European competition law has shifted considerably toward effectsbased analysis, meaning analysis of whether a challenged activity results in market harms. See
Daniel Crane, Ordoliberalism and the Freiburg School, in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICYLEGALAND ECONOMICS SOURCES 254 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013).
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factory conditions. Franchisors also exercise some control over their
franchisees-for instance, franchisors regulate a franchisee's property as
well as property that the franchisor never owned-in order to ensure quality
and uniformity.
Not all of these circumstances entail the exercise of market power in a
conventional sense, although most involve bilateral monopoly. Franchisees
who are locked into a long-term franchise relationship may complain that
the franchisor is exploiting its monopoly power to control their business
freedom, but there are good economic reasons to allow restrictive
franchising relationships.25 Contemporary antitrust law is generally skeptical
that labels like "tying" make much sense in this context. 6 Leading antitrust
scholars would hold that this sort of post-contract market power shouldn't
even be relevant to antitrust law.27
Then there is the problem of prohibiting the exercise of regulatory
market power only if it is the kind of control ordinarily exercised by the state
through the instrumentality of law. This might have made more sense in a
prior time in which the state exercised relatively light control over markets
and the lines between sovereign and private functions were more clearly
delineated. But how could such an idea be implemented in a time when the
state's regulatory hand touches virtually every sphere of economic activity?
Consider, again, the problem of standard setting. The state frequently
engages
in standardization-for
example by enacting mandatory
specifications for electrical wiring.28 But it is often desirable to leave
standard-setting to industry participants or other private actors-even
though the effects of their decisions will be to regulate the conduct of other
producers, retailers, and consumers who have no seat at the standardization
bargaining table. There may be good reasons to prohibit certain kinds of
activities by SSOs on consequentialist grounds, but the deployment of the
"regulatory harm" paradigm seems to add little of value to any such analysis.
The case for a "regulatory harm" theory of antitrust would be more
compelling if both market harm and regulatory harm were necessary to

25.

SeetAntonyW. Dries, The Economic Analysis ofFranchise Contracts, 1 5 2J. INSTITUTIONAL &

THEORETICAL ECON.

297 (1996).

26.
See, e.g., Rick-Mik Enters. Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F. 3 d 963, 971-72 (9 th Cir.
2oo8) ("[Tlhejustification for the challenge [against ties] rested on either an assumption or a
showing that the defendants position of power in the market for the tying product was being
used to restrain competition in the market for the tied product.") (quoting Ill. Tool Works Inc.
v. Indep. Ink, Irc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006)).

27.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION

309-10

(2005).

28.
See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Irc., 486 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1988)
(noting that states frequently adopt the code setting standards "for the design and installation
of electrical wiring systems"); Karim Jamal & Shyam Sunder, Monopoly or Competition: Standard
Setting in the Private and Public Sector (Univ. of Alta. Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2013-1005,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1075705.
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show an antitrust violation. But Nachbar appears to argue that a regulatory
harm, standing alone, might suffice. For example, in discussing tying law, he
notes that the "one monopoly rent theorem" suggests that monopoly
leverage through tying does not result in a market harm in the tied market.9
However, since tying without loss of market competitiveness still results in
regulatory harm, Nachbar would apparently continue to recognize tying as
problematic. Taken to its logical conclusion, such an approach would
seriously threaten efficiency, since many efficiency-enhancing arrangements
require precisely the types of regulatory controls by private actors with which
Nachbar is concerned.
To be sure, constitutional rights are often inefficient in an economic
sense. A few minority dissenters stubbornly refusing to conform to
majoritarian norms may bring a greater loss of utility to the majority than
gains to the dissenters, and yet our moral and ethical commitments may
require us to accord the dissenters their space. Freedom from private
regulatory control, however, does not bear the moral force that motivates
most constitutional rights. We live in a world of ubiquitous regulatory
control. Outside of scrutinizing its market effects, antitrust has little to
contribute on the optimal amount of such control.
CONCLUSION

I have written elsewhere that "[a]lthough the U.S. Supreme Court has
described the Sherman Act as the 'magna carta of free enterprise,' the U.S.
antitrust laws are not understood as constitutional in any meaningful
sense."3o Although Tom Nachbar has made a valiant effort to challenge
assumptions of this kind, his theory comes up short on both positive and
normative grounds. Antitrust is still best understood as a consequentialist
body of law designed to maximize economic efficiency and consumer
welfare.

29.

Nachbar, supra note 2, at 99.

30.

SeeCrane, supra note 24, at 253 (footnote omitted).

